We investigate necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibria that satisfy the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT ). In the Bayesian game G n among n jurors, we allow for arbitrary distribution on the types of jurors. In particular, any kind of dependency is possible. If each juror i has a "constant strategy", σ i (that is, a strategy that is independent of the size n ≥ i of the jury), such that σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n . . .) satisfies the CJT , then by McLennan (Am Political Sci Rev 92:413-419, 1998) there exists a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium that also satisfies the CJT . We translate the CJT condition on sequences of constant strategies into the following problem: (**) For a given sequence of binary random variables X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . . .) with joint distribution P, does the distribution P satisfy the asymptotic part of the CJT ?
Introduction
The simplest way to present our problem is by quoting Condorcet's classic result (see Young 1997) :
Theorem 1 (CJT -Condorcet 1785) Let n voters (n odd) choose between two alternatives that have equal likelihood of being correct a priori. Assume that voters make their
judgements independently and that each has the same probability p of being correct ( 1 2 < p < 1). Then, the probability that the group makes the correct judgement using simple majority rule is n h=(n+1)/2
[n!/ h!(n − h)!] p
h (1 − p) n−h which approaches 1 as n becomes large.
We build on some of the literature on this issue in the last 30 years. First, we notice that Nitzan and Paroush (1982) and Shapley and Grofman (1984) allow for unequal competencies of the juries. They replace the simple majority committee by weighted majority simple games to maintain the optimality of the voting rule.
Second, we notice that many papers are on the dependency among jurors. Among these papers are Shapley and Grofman (1984) , Boland et al. (1989) , Ladha (1992 Ladha ( , 1993 Ladha ( , 1995 , Berg (1993a,b) , Dietrich and List (2004) , Berend and Sapir (2007) , and Dietrich (2008) . It is widely understood and accepted that the votes of the jurors are often correlated. For example, group deliberation prior to voting is viewed, justifiably, as undermining independence (Grofman et al. 1983; Ladha 1992 Ladha , 1995 Estlund 1994; Dietrich and List 2004) . In particular, Dietrich (2008) argues that independence cannot be fully justified in the Condorcet jury model.
Finally, we mention the seminal paper of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) which incorporated strategic analysis into the Condorcet jury model. This paper had many followers, in particular McLennan (1998) and Duggan and Martinelli (2001) which investigated the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT ) for Bayesian-Nash equilibria (BNE) .
In this work, we investigate the CJT for BNE. Unlike Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), we do not assume that the types of the voters are independent (given the state of nature). Indeed, we assume arbitrary dependency among (the types of) jurors. As far as we could ascertain, McLennan (1998) is the only paper that studies the CJT for BNE assuming dependency among the jurors. In fact, we rely heavily on McLennan's work; the game among n jurors, is a Bayesian game G n in which all the players have the same payoff function which is the probability of correct decision. Therefore, any n-tuple of strategies σ n = (σ 1 n , . . . , σ n n ) that maximizes the common payoff is a BNE (McLennan 1998, Theorem 1). Now consider an infinite sequence of such strategies σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n , . . .) that are BNE for the sequence of games G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G n , . . . with a jury of growing size. If there exists any other sequence of strategies τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ n , . . .) (not necessarily BNE), that satisfies the CJT , then the original sequence σ is a sequence (of BNE) that also satisfies the CJT . Thus, we may focus on the following problem:
(*) For a given sequence of Bayesian games G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G n , . . . with an increasing set of jurors, find some sequence of strategies τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ n , . . .) where τ n is an n-tuple of strategies for the game G n , so that the sequence (τ n ) ∞ n=1 satisfies the CJT .
In view of the generality and the complexity of our model, we limit ourselves to sequences τ of "constant" strategies; that is, we assume that τ i n = τ i m if 1 ≤ i ≤ m ≤ 123 n < ∞. This means that the strategy τ i n of a specific juror i does not change when the size of the jury increases. We shall refer to such a sequence as a "constant sequence." 1 We prove that verifying the CJT for a constant sequence is equivalent to the following problem: (**) For a given sequence of binary random variables X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . . .) with joint distribution P, find whether or not the distribution P satisfies the CJT .
Note that prior to Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) , the analysis of the Condorcet jury problem had focused on problem (**). One general result is that of Berend and Paroush (1998) which characterizes the independent sequences of binary random variables that satisfy the CJT .
In this paper, we find sufficient conditions for (**). Then, we supply two general necessary conditions. However, we do not have a complete characterization of the solution to (**). We do have full characterization (necessary and sufficient conditions) for sequences of exchangeable random variables.
Our basic model is introduced in Sect. 2. The full characterization for the case of exchangeable variables is given in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we give sufficient conditions for the CJT . In Sect. 5, we develop necessary conditions for the validity of the CJT in two different planes of parameters of the distribution. In Sect. 6, we prove that these necessary conditions are not sufficient. In Sect. 7, we introduce the notion of interlacing of two sequences, which proves to be a useful tool to construct new classes of distributions that satisfy the CJT . In particular, we construct rich classes of non-exchangeable sequences that satisfy the CJT . We conclude in Sect. 8. Two proofs are given in the Appendix. In the last part of the appendix, we clarify the relationship between the CJT and the Law of Large Numbers (L L N ). Basically, we show that these are two different properties that do not imply each other in spite of their superficial similarity.
The basic model
We generalize Condorcet's model by presenting it as a game with incomplete information in the following way: let I = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of jurors and let D be the defendant. There are two states of nature: g-the defendant is guilty, and z-the defendant is innocent. Thus, = {g, z} is the set of states of nature. Each juror has two available actions: c-to convict the defendant, and a-to acquit the defendant; thus A = {a, c} is the action set of each of the jurors. Before voting, each juror gets a private random signal
In the terminology of games with incomplete information, T i is the type set of juror i. The private signals of the jurors may be dependent and may, of course, depend on the state of nature. Again, in the style of games with incomplete information, let n = × T 1 ×, . . . , ×T n be the set of the states of the world. That is, a state of the world ω = (θ, t 1 , . . . , t n ) consists of the state of nature and the list of types of the n jurors. Let p (n) be the probability distribution (i.e., a common prior) on n . This is the joint probability distribution of the state of nature and the signals (types) of all jurors. We assume that the action taken by the finite society of jurors I = {1, 2, . . . , n}.i.e., the jury verdict, is determined by the voting rule V : A I → A, which is the simple majority rule (with some tie-breaking procedure such as coin tossing). Finally, to complete the description of the game, we let all jurors have the same payoff function u : × A → R namely,
This concludes the definition of a game, which we denote by G n . A (pure) strategy of juror i ∈ I in G n is a function s i : T i → A. We denote by S i the set of all pure strategies of juror i ∈ I and by S = S 1 ×, . . . , ×S n the set of strategy profiles of the society. The (common) ex-ante payoff for each juror, when the strategy vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S is used, is E u = Eu(θ, V (s 1 (t 1 ), . . . , s n (t n ))), where θ is the true state of nature. Note that E u is precisely the probability of correct decision by I when the strategy vector s is used.
Example 1 In the original Condorcet theorem, we have
n) (z) = 1/2 and the types are conditionally independent given the state of nature; each has a probability p > 1/2 of getting the correct signal. That is,
Condorcet further assumed that all the jurors vote informatively, that is, use the strategy s i (t i z ) = a and s i (t i g ) = c. In this case, the probability of correct voting, by each juror, is p, and as the signals are (conditionally) independent, the CJT follows (for example, by the Law of Large Numbers).
Figure 1 illustrates our construction in the case n = 2. In this example, according to p (2) the state of nature is chosen with unequal probabilities for the two states: p (2) (g) = 1/4 and p (2) (z) = 3/4 and then the types of the two jurors are chosen according to a joint probability distribution that depends on the state of nature.
Following the seminal work of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) , we intend to study the CJT via the Bayesian-Nash Equilibria (BNE) of the game G n . However, unlike in the case of (conditionally) independent signals, there is no obvious way to find the relevant BNE in the general case of arbitrary dependence. Therefore, our approach will be indirect. Before describing our techniques, we first enlarge the set of strategies of the jurors by adding the possibility of mixed strategies. Indeed, it was shown by Wit (1998) that the introduction of mixed strategies may help the realization of the CJT .
A mixed strategy 2 for juror i ∈ I , in the game G n , is a function σ i n : T i → (A), where (A) is the set of probability distributions on A. Denote by i n the set of all mixed strategies of juror i and by n = 1 n × · · · × n n the set of mixed strategy vectors (profiles) in the game G n . The (common) ex-ante payoff for each juror, when the strategy vector
, where θ is the true state of nature. Again, E u is precisely the probability of correct decision by I when the strategy vector σ is played.
We shall now find a more explicit expression for the payoff E u . Given a strategy
, 1} the indicator of the set of correct voting of juror i when using the mixed strategy σ i . That is,
where by a slight abuse of notation we denoted by σ i n (t i n ) the realized pure action when juror i of type t i n uses mixed strategy σ i n . Given a strategy vector σ n = (σ 1 n , . . . , σ n n ), the probability distribution p (n) on n induces a joint probability distribution on the vector of binary random variables (X 1 n , X 2 n , . . . , X n n ) which we denote by p (n) σ n . Assume now that n is odd; then E u is given by
Guided by Condorcet, we are looking for limit theorems as the the size of the jury increases. Formally, as n goes to infinity we obtain an increasing sequence of "worlds", ( n ) ∞ n=1 , such that for all n, the projection of n+1 on n is the whole n . The corresponding sequence of probability distributions is ( p (n) ) ∞ n=1 and we assume that for every n, the marginal distribution of p (n+1) on n is p (n) . It follows from the Kolmogorov extension theorem (see Loève 1963, p. 93 ) that this defines a unique probability measure P on the (projective, or inverse) limit
such that, for all n, the marginal distribution of P on n is p (n) .
Let (σ n ) ∞ n=1 be an infinite sequence of strategy vectors for an increasing jury. We say that (σ n ) ∞ n=1 satisfies the (asymptotic part of) CJT if
Our aim in this work is to find sufficient conditions for the existence of a sequence of BNE (σ n ) ∞ n=1 that satisfy the (asymptotic part of) CJT . As far as we know, the only existing result on this general problem is that of Berend and Paroush (1998) , which deals only with independent jurors. For that, we make use of the following result due to McLennan for games with common interest (which is our case):
then σ * n is a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium of the game G n This is an immediate application of Theorem 1 in McLennan (1998) , which implies that σ * n is a Nash equilibrium of the type-agent representation of G n . Since by Theorem 2, a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium of G n maximizes the probability of correct decision, then clearly, if there exists any sequence of strategy vectors (σ n ) ∞ n=1 that satisfies the asymptotic part of CJT , (2), then there is also a sequence (σ * n ) ∞ n=1 of BNE that satisfies (2), the asymptotic part of CJT .
Our approach in this paper is to provide such a sequence that satisfies the CJT . In particular, we shall consider infinite sequences of mixed strategy vectors that are constant with respect to the number of players, that is,
Such a constant sequence can be represented as one infinite sequence of strategies σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n , . . .), where σ i is the strategy of juror i in all juries that he is a member of (i.e. in all games G n with n ≥ i). Whenever we find such a constant sequence that satisfies the CJT , it follow, as we argued, that there is a sequence (σ * n ) ∞ n=1 of BNE that satisfies (2), the asymptotic part of CJT . A constant sequence (σ n ) ∞ n=1 can be interpreted as a sequence of an increasing jury in which the strategies of the jury members do not change as the jury increases. In addition to their plausibility, we restrict our attention to constant sequences because of the complexity of our model. As we shall see, even with this restriction, we get some interesting results. The following two examples demonstrate the advantage of the game theoretical model over the traditional probabilistic model 3 .
Example 2 (Reverse voting) Suppose that given the state of nature, each juror has two types, t g and t z , and the signals of the voters are i.i.d. with p(t g | g) = p(t z | z) = p < 1/2. Clearly, in the probabilistic model with informative voting 4 such a jury will not satisfy the CJT . However, if we consider the strategy σ given by: σ (t g ) = a (that is, acquit with probability 1) and σ (t z ) = c (convict with probability 1), then the sequence of constant strategies σ = (σ, σ, . . . , σ, . . .) will satisfy the CJT and consequently, there exists a sequence (σ * n ) ∞ n=1 of BNE that satisfy (2), the asymptotic part of CJT .
Example 3 (Random voting) In a model with equal probability to the two states of nature ( p(g) = p(z) = 1/2), suppose that a fraction α of the jury (0 < α < 1/2) receive i.i.d. signals with probability p > 1/2 of being correct, that is p(
Again, in the probabilistic model with informative voting, such a jury will not satisfy the CJT . However, if only the well informed jurors vote informatively while the rest of the jurors vote randomly (convict with probability 1/2 and acquit with probability 1/2), such strategy vector will satisfy the CJT . Consequently, this game also has an infinite sequence (σ * n ) ∞ n=1 of BNE that satisfy the asymptotic part of CJT .
Remark 1 As far as we can see, the assumption of constant strategies will be needed only for our existence results (Theorem 5, Corollary 8, and Theorem 16). For the sufficient condition, as well as for the two necessary conditions, we need neither the restriction to constant strategies, nor the assumption on the stationarity of the probabilities p (n) (of G n ). The proofs are the same, with the appropriate adjustment of notations; mainly, for a general sequence of strategies (σ n ) ∞ n=1 , the corresponding sequence X of binary random variables, is the sequence of n-vectors of random variables (X 1 n , . . . , X n n ) corresponding to the game G n and the strategy vector σ n ; that is, X = (X 1 1 ; X 1 2 , X 2 2 ; . . . ; X 1 n , . . . , X n n ; . . .). The CJT property is defined, as usual, by Eq. 2. A constant sequence of mixed strategies σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n , . . .) naturally yields a sequence of binary random variables X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . . .) where
is the indicator variable of correct voting of juror i defined in (1), and is independent of n since the strategy is constant. As the CJT is expressed in terms of X , we shall mostly be working with this infinite sequence of binary random variables. In fact, working with the infinite sequences X is equivalent to working with the underlying infinite sequences of games and strategy vectors: on the one hand, as we said, a sequence of games (G n ) ∞ n=1 and an infinite sequence of constant strategies σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n , . . .), yield an infinite sequence X of binary random variables. On the other hand, as we show in Appendix 9.1, for any infinite sequence of binary random variables X there is a sequence of games (G n ) ∞ n=1 and an infinite sequence of constant strategies σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n , . . .) that yield this X as the infinite sequence of the indicators of correct voting.
Let us now briefly remark on the non-asymptotic part of the CJT (see Ben-Yashar and Paroush 2000) . An infinite sequence of mixed strategy vectors σ n = (σ 1 n , . . . , σ n n ), n = 1, 2, . . ., is said to be consistent with the majority rule if for n = 1, 2, . . .,
In view of the complexity of our model, we shall not investigate non-asymptotic consistency with majority rule of infinite sequences of strategies, and shall study only the asymptotic part of the CJT .
Exchangeable variables
In this section, we fully characterize the distributions of sequences X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . . .) of exchangeable random binary variables that satisfy the CJT . Let us first introduce some notation: Given a sequence of binary random variables
where E denotes, as usual, the expectation operator.
In our context, this property may be interpreted as anonymity of the jurors; the names and the location in the list of jurors does not affect the distribution of correct voting. Note that this does not rule out correlation between the distributions of the "correct voting" among jurors.
We shall make use of the following characterization theorem according to de Finetti 5 (see, e.g., Feller 1966, vol II, p. 225) .
Theorem 3 A sequence of binary random variables X
= (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . .
.) is exchangeable if and only if there is a probability distribution F on
In words, de-Finetti's theorem says that binary exchangeable variables are conditionally i.i.d.: Given the value of ρ, the variables are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with parameter ρ. In our underlying model, the parameter ρ can be interpreted as public information regarding the defendant (all available evidence, witnesses etc.). Given this public information, the distribution of "correct voting" is the same for all jurors and independent among jurors.
Using de Finetti's theorem, we can characterize the distributions of sequences of exchangeable binary random variables by their expectation and the asymptotic variance of X n . 
Theorem 4 Let
where
Proof We have
and for i = j,
Therefore,
which implies Eq. 6.
We can now state the characterization theorem: To prove that a sequence satisfying condition (7) also satisfies the CJT , note that for 0 < ε < 1/4,
. .) of binary exchangeable random variables with a corresponding distribution F(ρ) satisfies the CJT if and only if
For the second term in (8), we have:
Now, using Chebyshev's inequality we have:
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Since the last expression in (14) converges to 1 uniformly on [1/2 + 2ε, 1] as n → ∞, taking the limit n → ∞ of (12) and using (14) we have:
From (8) and (15), we have that for any fixed ε > 0,
Since (16) must hold for all 1/4 > ε > 0, and since Pr
i.e., the sequence X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . . .) satisfies the CJT .
To draw the consequences of Theorem 5, we prove first the following proposition which enables us, for testing the validity of the CJT , to use the easily computed parameters u and V (F), rather than the unknown distribution F.
Proposition 1 Any distribution F of a variable
where u = E(F), and equality holds in (18) only for F for which
Proof We want to show that
or, equivalently,
Replacing u = 1 1/2 ρ dF(ρ) and
The parabola g(ρ) is convex and satisfies g(1/2) = g(1) = 0 and g(ρ) < 0 for all 1/2 < ρ < 1, which proves (22). Furthermore, equality to 0 in (22) is obtained only when F is such that Pr(1/2 < ρ < 1) = 0, and combined with u = E(F) this implies (19).
The next Proposition provides a sort of inverse to proposition 1.
Proposition 2 For (u, w) = (1, 0) and for any pair (u, w) where 1/2 < u < 1 and
Proof For (u, w) = (1, 0) the claim is trivially true (with the distribution Pr(ρ = 1) = 1). Given (u, w) , for any y satisfying 1/2 < y ≤ u < 1 define the distribution F y for which
This distribution satisfies E(F y ) = u and it remains to show that we can choose y so that
For a given u < 1, this is a continuous function of y satisfying both lim y→u V (
there is a value y * for which V (F y * ) = w.
Presentation in R 2
In studying the validity of the CJT for a sequence X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . . .) with general joint distribution (X, P), rather than working with the whole covariance structure of the sequence, we shall see that many results can be obtained by examining just two parameters of the distribution namely, ( p, y) defined by.
(Note that this definition of y is consistent with that given in Eq. 6 for exchangeable variables; a case in which the limit exists.) Therefore, we shall study the CJT property of a sequence X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . . .) through its projection on the plane R 2 in which we shall denote the coordinates by (u, w) . We first identify the range of this mapping:
Proposition 3 For every pair (X, P), the corresponding parameters
Proof Given a sequence of binary random variables X with its joint distribution P, we first observe that for any i = j,
We claim that the maximum of the last expression (26), under the condition
This is attained when p 1 = · · · = p n = p n . To see that this is indeed the maximum, assume to the contrary that the maximum is attained atp = (p 1 , · · · ,p n ) withp i =p j for some i and j. Without loss of generality assume that:
and p * =p for / ∈ {1, j}. A tedious, but straightforward, computation shows that the expression (26) is higher for p * than forp, in contradiction to the assumption that it is maximized at p. We conclude that
Let now ( p n k ) ∞ k=1 be a subsequence converging to p; then
This leads to:
Theorem 6 The range of the mapping (X, P) → ( p, y) is (see Fig. 2 )
That is, for any pair (X, P), we have ( p, y) ∈ F E 2 and for any (u, w) ∈ F E 2 there is a pair (X, P) for which p = u and y = w. Proof The first part follows from Proposition 3 (since clearly y ≥ 0). For the second part, observe first, as we have remarked in the proof of Proposition 3, that for the pair (X, P) in which P{X 1 = X 2 = . . . = 1} = u and P{X 1 = X 2 = . . . = 0} = 1 − u we have p 1 = p 2 = · · · = p n = p n = u and hence p = u. Also, for all n = 1, 2, . . .,
which means that any point on the parabola w = u(1 − u) is attainable as an image of a pair (X, P). Next, note that for
It remains to prove that all interior points of F E 2 are attainable. Let (u, w) be such an interior point, that is, 0 < u < 1 and 0 < w < u(1 − u). Define the pair (Z , Q) to be the above-defined pair (X, P) with probability w/u(1 − u) and the above-defined (Y,P) with probability 1 − w/u(1 − u). It is readily seen that this pair is mapped to
The geometric expression of Theorem 5, combined with Theorem 3, Proposition 1, and Proposition 2, can now be stated as follows: in the R 2 plane of ( p, y) let
This is the region strictly below the small parabola in Fig. 3 , excluding (1/2, 0) and adding (1, 0). • Part 1. follows de Finetti's Theorem 3, Theorem 5, and Proposition 1.
• Part 2. follows de Finetti's Theorem 3, Theorem 5, and Proposition 2.
Application to symmetric juries
A jury game G n , as defined in Sect. 2, is said to be symmetric if
We consider a sequence of increasing juries (G n ) ∞ n=1 such that G n is symmetric for all n. In such a sequence, i n is the same for all i and all n and is denoted by . A strategy vector σ n = (σ 1 n , . . . , σ n n ) ∈ n is said to be symmetric, if σ 1 n = σ 2 n = . . . = σ n n . 
Corollary 8 Let

Sufficient conditions
Having characterized the CJT conditions for exchangeable variables, we proceed now to the general case and we start with sufficient conditions. Let X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . . .) be a sequence of binary random variables with range in {0, 1} and with joint probability distribution P. The sequence X is said to satisfy the CJT if
Observe that in our model the vector X results from strategic voting and (29) is the condition corresponding to condition (2) when X i = X i (σ i ) for an infinite sequence of constant strategies (σ i ) ∞ i=1 that satisfy C J T . In this section, we provide sufficient conditions for a pair (X, P) to satisfy the CJT . Recall our notation:
Theorem 9
Assume that p n > 1 2 for all n > N 0 and
or equivalently assume that
then the CJT is satisfied.
As this last term tends to zero by (30), the CJT (29) then follows.
Corollary 10 If
Proof Since the variance of a binary random variable X with mean p is
Remark 2 It follows from Eq. 30 that any (X, P) satisfying this sufficient condition must have y = 0; that is, it corresponds to a point ( p, 0) in the R 2 plane. Thus, any distribution with y > 0 that satisfy the CJT , does not satisfy this sufficient condition. In particular, this is true for the exchangeable sequences (with y > 0) we identified in Sect. 3 and the non-exchangeable sequences satisfying the CJT we will see in Sect. 7.
Remark 3 Note that under the condition of Corollary 10, namely, for bounded random variables with all covariances being non-positive, the (weak) Law of Large Numbers (L L N ) holds for arbitrarily dependent variables (see, e.g., Feller (1957) , vol I, exercise 9, p. 262). This is not implied by Corollary 10 since, as we show in Appendix 9.3, the CJT , strictly speaking, is not a Law of Large Lumbers. In particular, CJT does not imply L L N and L L N does not imply CJT . Proof Define a sequence of events (B n ) ∞ n=1 by B n = {ω | X n (ω) ≥ 1/2}. Since the CJT holds, lim n→∞ P n i=1 X i > n 2 = 1 and hence lim n→∞ P(B n ) = 1. Since
Remark 4 When
taking the lim inf, the right-hand side tends to zero and we obtain that lim inf n→∞ p n = p ≥ 1 2 .
A necessary condition with respect to the L 2 norm
In this section, we provide a necessary condition with respect to the L 2 norm for a general sequence (X, P) to satisfy the CJT . That is, a condition in terms of two characteristics, p = lim inf n→∞ p n and y = lim inf n→∞ E(X n − p n ) 2 .
Theorem 11 Let
X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . . .
) be a sequence of binary random variables with joint distribution P. If (X, P) satisfy the CJT , then y
Proof Recall our notation B n = {ω ∈ | X n (ω) ≥ 1 2 }; then, since (X, P) satisfy the CJT , lim n→∞ P(B n ) = 1. The main part of the proof is a direct computation of E(X n (ω) − p n ) 2 . Denote by B c n := \ B n the complement of B n ; then:
Thus,
We conclude that
for every ε > 0. Hence,
123 Fig. 4 The CJT region of validity for general distributions
Figure 4 depicts the regions of validity of the CJT in the R 2 plane: any distribution for which the parameters ( p, y) lie in lightly colored region denoted by NCJT , does not satisfy the C J T . In particular, if a sequence of strategy vectors (σ n ) ∞ n=1 in McLennan's theorem (i.e. maximizers in Equation (3)) does not satisfy the necessary condition (i.e., the corresponding ( p, y) lies in the region NCJT ) then there is no sequence of strategies (σ n ) ∞ n=1 , whether constant or not, that satisfy the CJT . The dark region, denoted by WCJT (for weak C J T ), is the closed area below the small parabola. Any distribution that satisfies the CJT must have parameters ( p, y) in this region. However, for general distributions this is not a sufficient condition; as we shall see later, for any ( p, y) in this region, excluding (1, 0), there is a sequence with these parameters that does not satisfy the CJT .
A necessary condition with respect to the L 1 norm
In this section, we provide a necessary condition with respect to the L 1 norm for a general sequence (X, P) to satisfy the CJT . That is, a condition in terms of two characteristics, p = lim inf n→∞ p n and y * = lim inf n→∞ E X n − p n . Strangely enough, Theorem 12 and Theorem 11 do not imply each other in either direction. Furthermore, the techniques of the proofs for the L 1 norm and for the L 2 norm are very different. We could derive only a weak implication in one direction which stems from the following lemma:
Lemma 1 One always has: y * ≥ 2y.
Proof Denoting A n = {ω ∈ | p n − X n (ω) ≥ 0}, we have:
Similarly,
Hence, for all n we have:
123 Fig. 6 The CJT validity region with respect to the L 2 norm as implied by the condition with respect to the L 1 norm
Taking a subsequence (n k ) ∞ k=1 such that lim k→∞ y * n k = y * , we conclude that
Combining Lemma 1 with Theorem 12 yields,
) be a sequence of binary random variables with joint distribution P. If y > (2 p − 1)(1 − p), then (X, P) does not satisfy the CJT .
Figure 6 depicts the conclusion of the last corollary: the region with the lightest color, denoted by NCJT , is the region in which the C J T is not satisfied for any (X, P) with these values of ( p, y). The darkest region, denoted by WCJT , is the region of ( p, y) for which there exist (X, P) with these parameters that satisfy the CJT . Clearly, this is a weaker result than Theorem 11 that we obtained directly for the L 2 norm and is described in Figure 4 according to which, the crescent in Figure 6 , denoted by "?", belongs to the NCJT region.
Distributions in WCJT that do not satisfy the CJT
In this section, we prove that the necessary conditions stated in Theorems 11 and 12 are not sufficient. In fact, we prove a stronger result, namely: to any pair of parameters in the closure of the dark WCJT region (either in Fig. 4 for the L 2 norm or in Fig. 5 for the L 1 norm), excluding the point (1, 0), there is a distribution that does not satisfy the CJT . We shall prove this only for the L 2 norm (the proof for the L 1 norm is similar). This is established by the following:
there is a sequence of binary random variables Z with joint distribution H such that:
. . and H t is the product distribution H t = F 0 × F 1 (that is, the X and the Y sequences are independent). Note first that E(Z i t ) = u for all i and
and therefore, the pair (Z t , H t ) corresponds to the point (u, w) in the L 2 space, where
As this argument does not apply for t = 0 it remains to prove that, except for (1, 0), to any point (u, 0) on the x axis corresponds a distribution that does not satisfy the CJT . For 0 ≤ u ≤ 1/2, the sequence (Y,
with expectation u does not satisfy the CJT , as follows from the result of Berend and Paroush (1998) . For 1/2 < u < 1 such a sequence of i.i.d. random variables does satisfy the CJT and we need the following more subtle construction.
Given the two sequences (X, F 0 ) and (Y, F 1 ) defined above, we construct a sequence Z = (Z i ) ∞ i=1 consisting of alternating blocks of X i s and Y i s, with the probability distribution on Z being that induced by the product probability H = F 0 × F 1 . Clearly E(Z i ) = u for all i, in particular p n = u for all n and p = u. We denote by B the set of indices of the th block and its cardinality by b . Thus, n( ) = j=1 b j is the index of Z i at the end of the th block. Therefore,
Define the block size b inductively by:
1. b 1 = 1, and for k = 1, 2, . . .;
Finally, we define the sequence Z = (Z i ) ∞ i=1 to consist of X i s in the odd blocks and Y i s in the even blocks, that is,
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Denote by n x ( ) and n y ( ) the number of X coordinates and Y coordinates respectively in the sequence Z at the end of the th block and by n( ) = n x ( ) + n y ( ) the number of coordinates at the end of the th block of Z . It follows from 1 and 2 (in the definition of b ) that for k = 1, 2, . . .,
It follows from (33) that at the end of each odd-numbered block 2k − 1, there is a majority of X i coordinates that with probability (1 − u) will all have the value 0. Therefore,
and hence
that is, (Z , H ) does not satisfy the CJT . It remains to show that
To do so, we show that the subsequence of
corresponding to the end of the even-numbered blocks converges to 0, namely,
Indeed,
Since the Y i s are i.i.d. and independent of X 1 we have
and by property (34) we get finally:
concluding the proof of the theorem.
An immediate implication of Theorem 14 is the following:
Corollary 15 For any pair of parameters ( p, y) satisfying 1/2 ≤ p < 1 and 0 ≤ y ≤ ( p − 1/2)(1 − p) (that is, the point ( p, y) is in the closure of the region WCJT in Fig. 4, excluding (1, 0) ), there is a distribution with these parameters that does not satisfy the CJT .
Non-exchangeable sequences satisfying the CJT
In this section, we prove the existence of sequences (X, P) of dependent random variables, sequences that are non-exchangeable and satisfy the CJT . By Theorem 11, such distributions must have their parameter in the closure of the dark WCJT region (either in Fig. 4 in L 2 or in Fig. 5 in L 1 ). In fact, we shall prove that for any point in this region there is a distribution that satisfies the CJT , and is not exchangeable. We shall prove that only in the L 2 plane. The proof for the L 1 plane is similar. The construction of these sequences uses the idea of the interlacing of two sequences, which can be generalized and proves to be useful. Proof To illustrate the idea of the proof we first prove (somewhat informally) the case t = 1/2. Let X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . . .) be a sequence of binary random variables with a joint probability distribution 
and let the probability distribution H of Z be the product distribution H = F × G. It is verified by straightforward computation that the parameters of the distribution H are in accordance with the theorem for t = The proof for a general t ∈ [0, 1/2) follows the same lines: we construct the sequence Z so that any finite initial segment of n variables, includes "about, but not more than" the initial tn segment of the X sequence, and the rest is filled with the constant Y i variables. This will imply that the CJT is satisfied.
Formally, for any real x ≥ 0 let x be the largest integer less than or equal to x and let x be smallest integer greater than or equal to x. Note that for any n and any 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 we have tn + (1 − t)n = n; thus, one and only one of the following holds:
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From the given sequence X and the above-defined sequence Y (of constant 1 variables) we define now the sequence Z = (Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . , Z n , . . .) as follows: Z 1 = Y 1 and for any n ≥ 2, let Z n = X t (n+1) if (i) holds and Z n = Y (1−t)(n+1) if (ii) holds. This inductive construction guarantees that for all n, the sequence contains tn X i coordinates and (1 − t)n Y i coordinates. The probability distribution H is the product distribution F × G. The fact that (Z , H ) satisfies the CJT follows from:
and finallyp = 1 − t + t p andỹ = t 2 y is verified by straightforward computation.
Remark 5 • Note that the sequence Z is clearly not exchangeable (except for the case t = 0 which corresponds to (1, 0) ).
• The interlacing of the two sequences X and Y described in the proof of Theorem 16 may be defined for any t ∈ [0, 1]. We were specifically interested in t ∈ [0, 1/2] since this guarantees the CJT . Figure 7 depicts the interlacing procedure: the parabolic line joining (u * , w * ) to the point (1, 0), corresponds to all interlacing with t ∈ [0, 1]. The lower part, described as a thick line, corresponds to interlacing when t ∈ [0, 1/2]. For these values of t, the interlacing yields distributions satisfying the CJT . The small parabola is the locus of points corresponding to t = 1/2 when (u * , w * ) ranges over the parabola w = u(1−u).
Corollary 17 For any ( p, y) in the set
(this is the closure of the region WCJT in Fig. 4) , there is a sequence of non-exchangeable random variables, with these parameters, that satisfy the CJT .
Proof By straightforward verification we observe that the set A is obtained from Theorem 16 by letting ( p, y) range over the points of parabola w = u(1 − u) defining the feasible set F E 2 . In other words, A can also be written as:
Note that A is the closure of the set A defined in Eq. 28 for exchangeable variables, but A = A. More specifically, the points ( p, y) on the parabola y = ( p − 1/2)(1 − p), excluding (1, 0), are in A but not in A. For each of these points there is a corresponding sequence satisfying the CJT but this sequence cannot be exchangeable.
Finally, combining Corollary 17 and Theorem 14 yields:
By our construction and the fact that both (X, F) and (Y, G) satisfy the CJT ,
the proof follows.
Thus, from any two distributions satisfying the CJT we can construct a continuum of distributions satisfying the CJT . These distributions will generally be outside the union of the three families listed above.
Conclusions
We have analyzed the Condorcet jury problem in a detailed manner as a strategic game with incomplete information (Sect. 2). This framework has the following advantages:
(I) It is in line with the modern approach of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) ; (II) It enables us to focus on a natural candidate BNE for satisfying the CJT , namely, McLennan's BNE (see Theorem 2); (III) It explains, in a transparent way, Condorcet's own model which was originally restricted to two types of voters and informative voting; (IV) It enables us to deal with "reverse voting" and "random voting" (and other strategies) without altering our model, since we consider all possible strategies and not only informative voting (see Examples 3 and 2); (V) Using our model, we find (sharp) necessary conditions for the existence of a sequence of BNE that satisfies the CJT. Indeed, as we stated on page (22) Banks (1996) ).
Technically, we deal, in most of the paper, with distributions of sequences of binary random variables that are derived from sequences of strategies of the players. This is mainly implied by the fact that the CJT is a probabilistic property. In Sect. 3 we find necessary and sufficient conditions for a sequence of exchangeable variables to satisfy the CJT (see Theorem 5). We then go on to find a purely geometrical characterization for our result. For exchangeable variables, the geometric condition is fully determined by the expectation of a variable in the sequence and the covariance of the two variables (see Theorem 7). Our sufficient conditions are standard and are derived by Chebyshev's inequality. On the other hand, the derivation of the necessary conditions makes use of special techniques. The necessary condition with respect to the L 2 norm, quite surprisingly, coincides with the necessary condition for exchangeable variables. However, of course, it is not a sufficient condition for general sequences of random variables. Indeed in Sect. 6, we provide sequences of random variables satisfying this necessary condition but do not satisfy the CJT (see Theorem 14 and Corollary 15). The necessary condition with respect to the L 1 norm is difficult to derive and may be useful in special cases. Finally, we introduce in Sect. 7 the operation of interlacing of two sequences of random variables. This enables to generate many new dependant sequences of binary random variables that satisfy the CJT . which means that we obtained the original given sequence.
Proof of Theorem 12
In this section, we provide a necessary condition for a general sequence of binary random variables X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . . .) with joint distribution P, in terms of two of its characteristics namely, p = lim inf n→∞ p n and y * = lim inf n→∞ E|X n − p n |.
Let y * n = E|X n − p n |; then y * = lim inf n→∞ y * n . For n = 1, 2, . . ., let
Also,
Hence, since X n ≥ 0,
Assuming y * > 0 and p < 1, it follows from (38) and (36) that there is a subse- 
Lemma 3 Let t > 0; then
Proof Assume by contradiction that (40) does not hold; then, since the sets on the left-hand side are subsets of A n k , it follows from (39) that:
Denote:
Clearly, lim k→∞ P(Ã n k ) = = lim k→∞ P(A n k ) and sinceÃ n k ⊆ A n k , we have
Thus for k 0 sufficiently large, the inequality (42) contradicts the last equality in (37) for n = n k 0 .
then, by Lemma 3, there is a subsequence (B n k ) ∞ k=1 and q > 0, such that P(B n k ) > q > 0 for all k, that is X n k (ω) < p n k − y * n k 2P(A n k ) + t; ∀ω ∈ B n k ; ∀k.
Example 4 + t; ∀ω ∈ B n k ; ∀k.
By taking subsequences of (n k ) ∞ k=1 (to make y * 
implying that X n k (ω) < 2t; ∀ω ∈ B n k ; ∀k > k 0 .
As t > 0 is arbitrary, in particular, if 2t < 1/2; since P(B n k ) > q > 0 for all k, inequalities (46) imply that (X, P) does not satisfy the CJT .
We conclude: No distribution with We conclude that X n k (ω) < 1 2 , for all ω ∈ B n k and for all k > k 0 , implying that (X, P) does not satisfy the CJT .
9.3 The CJT and the law of large numbers At first sight, the asymptotic CJT condition may look rather similar to the well-known Law of Large Numbers (L L N ). It is the purpose of this section to clarify and state precisely the relationship between these two concepts.
Recall that an infinite sequence of binary random variables X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . . .) with a joint probability distribution P satisfies the (weak) Law of Large Numbers (L L N ) if (in our notations):
while it satisfies the CJT if:
Since by Proposition 4, the condition p ≥ 1 2 is necessary for the validity of the CJT , let us check the relationship between the L L N and the CJT in this region. Our first observation is:
Proposition 5 For a sequence X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , . . .) with probability distribution P satisfying p > Proof Let p = 1/2 + 3δ for some δ > 0 and let N 0 be such that p n > 1/2 + 2δ for all n > N 0 ; then for all n > N 0 we have
Since the last expression tends to 1 as n → ∞, the first expression does too, and hence the CJT holds.
Remark 6 The statement of Proposition 5 does not hold for p = The proof is elementary and can be found, e.g., in Uspensky (1937, p. 185) . It follows thus from Proposition 6 that L L N cannot hold when y > 0 and thus we cannot use Proposition 5 to establish distributions in this region that satisfy the CJT .
Summing up, The L L N and the CJT are substantially two different properties that do not imply each other. The partial implication L L N ⇒ CJT applies only for the horizontal line in L 2 ; ( p, 0), for p > 1/2, where the CJT is easily established directly. Furthermore, all distributions with y > 0 for which we established the validity of the CJT do not satisfy the L L N .
